We provide empirical evidence on how delay in raising outside capital affects firms' financing decisions. We exploit the 2005 Security Offerings Reform as a quasi-natural experiment where for a subset of large US firms the regulatory delay (1-1.5 months) associated with raising public debt is eliminated. Difference-in-differences estimates suggest that financially constrained firms respond to reduced delay by switching 35%-45% of their debt issues from private to public markets, while we find no effect on unconstrained firms. We further show that a reduction in delay does not affect bond yields but is associated with the use of more debt covenants, implying a potential trade-off.
Introduction
It is not yet well understood how delay in raising outside debt affects firms' financing decisions. The risk of inefficient liquidations or forgoing lucrative investment opportunities should be two main reasons why delayed access to capital markets is costly for firms. However, delay such as waiting for regulatory clearance also gives lenders time to mitigate informational asymmetries, in turn improving liquidity and reducing yields. This suggests an important trade-off, driving the net effect of delay as a financing friction.
The classical view, that firms can raise capital instantly and at no cost, disregards delay as a financing friction altogether (Modigliani and Miller, 1958 ). Yet, recent survey evidence by Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) shows that the possibility of delayed access to external financing -and heretofore the risk of inefficient liquidations and forgone investment opportunities -is a crucial factor informing CFOs' decisions on cash holdings and debt maturities. Kulak (2011) empirically confirms this finding, showing that firms significantly reduce cash holdings when regulatory delay vanishes. Choi, Hackbarth, and Zechner (2013) show that firms spread out their debt maturities over time as a response to the risk of delayed access to external financing. Firms' willingness to hold costly excess cash or to incur the additional fixed cost of multiple bond issues underlines the importance of issuance delay as a capital market friction. These results are surprising in the light of the little attention issuing delay has received, compared to other capital market frictions such as cost of raising funds, informational frictions and optimal leverage. This paper seeks to provide an understanding of the circumstances under which issuing delay affects firms' financing decisions and how.
We empirically test how firms alter their debt issuance when delay is reduced. This entails the challenge, that most proxies for delay (e.g. past delays of the firm or within the industry) may themselves be correlated with vulnerability to inefficient liquidation, risk of forgoing investment opportunities, informational frictions and other hard to control firm characteristics. Further, unforeseeable delay should have a stronger impact on firms' policies than foreseeable delay. We address these issues by exploiting the 2005 Securities Offerings Reform (henceforth 2005 Reform) as a quasi-natural experiment in which a subset of US firms underwent a large exogenous variation in unforeseeable regulatory delay when issuing new public debt (and equity).
Before the 2005 Reform, all US firms were required to obtain clearance from the Securities and Exchange Commission (henceforth SEC) before proceeding to issue public securities.
the 2-year period surrounding the reform from the core sample, but retain the remaining years for robustness checks.
We document several novel findings which are consistent with a trade-off between mitigating informational asymmetries and not foregoing investment opportunities. Our results suggest that in the pre-reform period, cost of delays significantly outweighed benefits, thus documenting the success of the 2005 Securities Offerings Reform in improving overall capital market efficiency.
We use difference-in-differences estimates to establish a causal link between less delay and firms' switching their debt issues from private to public markets. Firms with WKSI status (treated) increase their share of public issuance by 25-30% (from 50% to 75-80%), relative to their unaffected non-WKSI peers. This result documents debt issuers' strong preference for less delay, strong enough to switch from private to public issuance.
These results are mainly driven by financially constrained firms. Sample splits by proxies for financial constraint (low payout ratio, speculative grade rating, low age, low CF/Assets)
show that financially constrained treated firms increase their share of public placements by 35-50%, compared to a 0-15% increase for financially unconstrained treated firms. The finding that delay matters most for financially constrained firms is consistent with avoiding inefficient liquidations as well as not foregoing investment opportunities. We corroborate this finding with a saturated difference-in-differences model, in which the average treatment effect (henceforth ATE) is interacted with controls and increases with covariates associated with financial constraint.
In line with this finding, we further document that treated firms respond to the increased attractiveness of public debt by increasing their leverage. This increase in leverage is achieved through a re-balancing of the capital structure, as treated firms do no increase their assets vis-a-vis control group firms.
As a falsification test of these results, we estimate placebo regressions for non-reform periods. We fail to reproduce significant estimates of ATE in the placebo periods, confirming that our findings indeed uniquely occur in the reform year. To diffuse concerns about the dependent variable's binary character, we reproduce and confirm our findings in a logit regression setup.
We conduct further analyses to shed light on the trade-off involved in reducing delay, through potentially exacerbating informational asymmetries. In line with the literature we find that a reduction in delay has no causal effect on bond yields (Gao and Ritter, 2010; Allen, Lamy, and Thompson, 1990; Fenn, 2000) . We do, however, document a causal link between delay and the use of debt covenants. Analysing the 18 most commonly used covenants in the FISD database, we find that a reduction in delay is associated with an increase in the use of all 18 debt covenants examined. The increase is most pronounced for covenants protecting bond holders from debt overhang and asset substitution (collateral related) as well as dividend payout and guarantees concerning subsidiaries. These findings are consistent with the trade-off argument, showing that bond investors do value delay to conduct due diligence and mitigate informational asymmetries.
While financially constrained firms use more debt covenants, we also find that the increase in covenant usage, following a reduction in delay, is mainly driven by financially unconstrained firms. This finding corroborates the importance of delay for investors conducting credit analyses. It further is consistent with issuers employing covenants to signal low risk or no intent to substitute assets. Our findings are novel in that we show that lenders are shielded from additional risk by a more comprehensive set of covenants, rather than compensated for risk with higher yields. 4 This paper's contributions to the literature are threefold. First and foremost, our results document the importance of delay as a financing friction. Unlike the management literature, in which timing is considered of great strategic importance to firms, the literature on corporate finance places little emphasis on timing. Baskin (1987) and Hugonnier, Malamud, and Morellec (2010) develop theoretical models accounting for financing delay as a friction impacting firms' financing choices. A number of recent empirical studies show that urgent liquidity needs and strategic implications arising from regulatory delay inform firms' choice of security type as well as placement channel (Fenn, 2000; Chaplinsky and Haushalter, 2010; Gao and Ritter, 2010; Kulak, 2011) . Our paper adds to these studies by exploiting a quasiexperimental setting with exogenous variation in regulatory delay to show that firms' choice of issuance channel is informed by delay considerations. Second, our paper adds to the understanding of the role of delay in mitigating infor-4 Note that in an efficient market setting, lenders should be indifferent to being compensated through higher yields or more covenants. "Good" borrowers, who ex ante did not intent do breach covenants, are better off. "Bad" borrowers, who ex ante would have breached covenants, lose the opportunity for opportunistic behaviour but also benefit from lower yields mational asymmetries. While Gustafson (2012) shows that in seasoned equity offerings underpricing is indeed exacerbated when delay is reduced, a number of earlier studies find that bond yields are not effected by delay, thus negating the existence of a trade-off in financing delay (Gao and Ritter, 2010; Allen, Lamy, and Thompson, 1990; Fenn, 2000) . While the importance of covenants in insulating investors from informational asymmetries is well established, we are, to our knowledge, the first to demonstrate that covenants are used to compensate investors for a reduction in delay and time for due diligence. As such, we provide first evidence for a trade-off between mitigating informational asymmetries and ensuring firms' timely access to capital.
Last, we evaluate the 2005 Securities Offerings Reform. We find that the SEC has succeeded in containing the growth of private placements for debt-and convertible debt issues and reasserted its monitoring role on debt markets. The unequivocal shift from private to public debt issuance channels suggests that pre-reform, the costs of delay outweigh the merits for a vast majority of the treated firms. As such, the 2005 Securities Offerings Reform has improved capital market efficiency.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 derives a set of hypotheses.
Section 3 presents data sources, summary statistics and stylized facts. Section 4 presents empirical strategy and results. Section 5 concludes.
Hypotheses
Delay in raising outside capital is not unequivocally good or bad from an issuer's point of view. While delay exposes firms to the risk of inefficient liquidations or strategic disadvantages in exploiting growth opportunities, it ultimately serves to protect investors by affording them sufficient time to conduct research and reduce informational asymmetries. This implies a trade-off in determining the optimal level of delay. 5 Observing how firms alter their debt issuance in response to a reduction in regulatory delay ensuing the 2005 Reform allows us to evaluate this trade-off. In the remainder of this section, we will derive hypotheses concerning the response of treated firms to reduced delay in public debt issuance.
In addition to recent survey evidence by Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) 6 , and studies 5 As optimal delay will differ across firms and even across debt issues, and as it is regulators and not firms who stipulate the regulatory delay, the delay prevailing in markets will not constitute an equilibrium outcome.
6 Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) conduct a survey with 204 CFOs from different countries which have by Fenn (2000) , Chaplinsky and Haushalter (2010) , Gao and Ritter (2010) , stylized facts from past changes in the regulatory environment provide evidence for the importance firms attribute to delay in raising outside capital.
Since the inception of the transaction based registration system, governed by the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, US public securities need to be registered with, and cleared by the SEC. The waiting-period inflicted on issuers usually lies in the range of 1-1.5 months, however with the risk of much longer delays in case of detailed reviews (Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; Chang and Shin, 2004; Bethel and Krigman, 2008; Bortolotti, Megginson, and Smart, 2008 Commission, 1996; Bethel and Sirri, 1998) . 10
All of the above arguments provide evidence for firms' inclination to select issuance channels based on delay considerations, even though public markets usually offer better ranked 22 financing frictions by the extent to which it impacts their decision to hold cash. Issuing delay was ranked 4th, ahead of cost of raising capital (9th), not deviating from target leverage (12th), and informational frictions (16th). 7 In 1982, the inception of shelf registration under rule 415 afforded firms the option to pre-register public securities so they could later, if needed, take them "off the shelf". While shelf registration was subject to SEC clearance, take-downs from the shelf were not, so that issuers enjoyed much swifter access to capital (Kulak, 2011; Bethel and Krigman, 2008) . Shelf registration requires firms to pre-commit to security type and amounts, so the reduced issuing delay came at the cost of less flexibility as well as signalling and market overhang concerns (Bhagat, Marr, and Thompson, 1985; Allen, Lamy, and Thompson, 1990; Denis, 1991 Denis, , 1993 Bethel and Krigman, 2008; Securities and Exchange Commission, 1996) . Despite these concerns, shelf registration accounted for roughly 50% of all debt issues (Securities and Exchange Commission, 1996) .
8 Qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) are purchasers of securities which the SEC considers sufficiently sophisticated not to require the same protection from issuers as most public investors and individuals. Under rule 144A, the prerequisite for obtaining QIB status is at least USD 100 million in assets under management. Banks, thrifts and insurers additionally are required to have a net worth of USD 25 million. Under rule 144A, the resale of private placements is permitted, so long as they are resold to qualified institutional buyers (Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 1998) .
9 The Rule 144A private market was established by the SEC to create a more liquid class of private placements in order to attract new and predominantly foreign issuers which were previously discouraged by the illiquidity premia in traditional private placement markets as well as by registration requirements in public markets (Carey, Prowse, Rea, and Udell, 1993) . Following the inception in April 1990, the Rule 144A market captured 80% of all junk bond offerings by 1997 (Fenn, 2000; Livingston and Zhou, 2002; Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 1998) as well as 83% of all convertible debt issues by 2004 (Huang and Ramirez, 2010) .
10 Already in 1996, the SEC contemplated a complete overhaul of the shelf registration procedure to the end of reducing regulatory delay without forcing issuers to reveal believes about future capital needs (Securities and Exchange Commission, 1996) . liquidity and a more diversified ownership structure. We therefore expect that firms will respond to a decrease in regulatory delay in public debt issues with increasing their propensity to issue public debt at the cost of private debt.
We further expect the hypothesised shift towards public issuance to be predominantly driven by financially constrained firms. It was predominantly speculative grade firms which switched from public to private issuance following the introduction of rule 144A in 1990. The rule 144A public market already in 1997 captured more than 80% of the market for domestic junk bond offerings (Fenn, 2000; Livingston and Zhou, 2002; Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 1998) as well as 83% of the domestic convertible debt issues in 2004 (Huang and Ramirez, 2010 ). This evidence is consistent with theoretical predictions. First, financially constrained firms face higher costs of capital, thus holing precautionary cash becomes less viable (Kulak, 2011) . We therefore expect firms with investment grade status to be less affected by changes in delay than their speculative grade peers. Second, firms which generate sufficient cash flows to fund investments internally are better insulated from delays in raising outside capital.
But even large cash flows may be matched by an equivalent demand for funding lucrative investments or rolling over of maturing debt. Firms with a high payout ratio, by contrast, are returning money to shareholders, presumably as they cannot put the funds to better use internally, meaning they can buffer delay by postponing payout. Finally, firms' age has predictive power on their ability to internally fund investments, as young firms often possess ample growth opportunities but have small cash-flows, whereas mature firms often lack growth opportunities but generate steady streams of internal funds. As such, we expect firms with large cash-flows, high payout ratios and older firms to be less sensitive to delays in raising outside capital.
The Reform has eliminated regulatory delay for public debt and equity issues, so that both gain in attractiveness compared to their private market alternatives. But while Gustafson (2012) shows that the acceleration of SEOs following the 2005 Reform has led to a 27% increase in underpricing, investors apparently do not have to pay for speed in debt issues through higher premia (Fenn, 2000) . 11
11 While Chaplinsky and Ramchand (1998) find that investors require significant premia for debt issues on the Rule 144A (private) market and Sengupta (1998) shows that disclosure quality generally impacts premia paid on debt, there is contradicting evidence from studies in the 1980s, suggesting that shelf registration reduced bond yields (Kidwell, Marr, and Thompson, 1984; Rogowski and Sorensen, 1985) . But Gao and Ritter (2010) and Allen, Lamy, and Thompson (1990) demonstrate that firms, which self-select to take advantage of accelerated equity offerings, differ significantly from those that opt for traditional non-accelerated offerings.
Informational asymmetries explain why speed comes at a price in public equity issues but bears no premium in public debt issues. They are more severe for equity holders (Leland, 1994; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , as issuing equity entails negative signaling (Leland and Pyle, 1977) and the position as residual claimant implies higher sensitivity to volatility and uncertainty. Therefore, demand for due diligence and thus delay should be higher in equity issues. In support of this view, Gustafson (2012) finds that in the presence of regulatory delay the prestige and size of the underwriter network reduce issuance cost, while after the elimination of delay the underwriter relationship becomes paramount to reducing issuance cost.
Debt holders, on the other hand, are vulnerable to debt overhang and asset substitution (Leland, 1994) as increasing risk will allow the management to shift value away from debt holders and towards equity holders. While knowledge of a firm's corporate governance is useful to evaluating the risk of moral hazard it cannot address it. Covenants, if compliance is enforced, can prevent moral hazard. Indeed, positive net worth covenants -just like most covenants governing collateral, payout, etc. decisions -can, by preventing asset substitution, increase debt value, overall asset value and as such welfare (Leland, 1994) .
We therefore suppose that bond yields will not increase in response to the elimination of regulatory delay. But without the time to analyze risk of moral hazard and the need for covenants, investors will require a more comprehensive set of covenants from all investors, good (unconstrained) and bad (constrained) alike. This implies that covenant usage increases especially for unconstrained issuers.
We further suppose that firms respond to the elimination of regulatory delay by increasing leverage. While for accelerated equity the benefit of speed if offset by severe underpricing, accelerated debt is offset with more covenants which are free for good issuers. Therefore, public debt should benefit more from the elimination of regulatory delay than equity.
Data Description

Data Sources
Corporate bond issues, including private placements under rule 144A, are drawn from Mergent's Fixed Income Security Database (FISD). These entail issue characteristics including issue dates, maturity, yields, and covenants. Accounting data are drawn from the COMPU-STAT tapes. We exclude issues by utilities, financial firms, and public administration (SIC codes 4900-5000, 6000-7000, and ≥ 9000), as well as issues conducted by foreign firms in the US (Yankees). To avoid the impact of mergers or corporate restructurings, we eliminate issues if the issuing firm exhibits negative or missing values for sales, cash, assets, or for sales-or asset growth in excess of 100% (Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Acharya, Almeida, and Campello, 2007; Fresard, 2010) . We further exclude credit agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Farmer Mac) as well as ADRs, ADSs, beneficial institutions, capital shares, limited liability institutions and partnerships. We winsorize the top and bottom 1% of all variables to minimize the impact of data errors and outliers. We collect public float data, which is indispensable for the identification of treatment status, from the header of annual 10-K filings (Kulak, 2011; Iliev, 2010; Gao, Wu, and Zimmerman, 2009 ) which we obtain from the SEC's EDGAR database. 12 Following Iliev (2010) and Kulak (2011), we find that some firms report public float values that do not correspond to the fiscal end of the 2nd quarter. This does not inhibit a consistent estimation of year round public float values but we still eliminate these observations from the sample to avoid confusing public float and market capitalization date, which often are reported in the same paragraph and in proximity to the fiscal quarter end. 13 Merging respective data yields an unbalanced panel of bond issues from December 2002 to November 2008. 14 12 We retrieve the public float information, using an automated search algorithm which follows a two stage approach identifying the relevant paragraph in the 10-K filing and subsequently extracts the public float value from within that paragraph. The search algorithm identifies the relevant paragraph within the header of firms' 10-K filings, running a search query for "aggregate market value" and "non-affiliates" as well as common variations of respective values (i.e. missing spaces, missing dash, or missing words) (Kulak, 2011) . The algorithm extracts all dollar and date values from the identified public float paragraph and in case of multiple dollar values matches each dollar values with the corresponding date based on order and distance in the paragraph. We manually retrieved missing values or values for which the search algorithm could not unequivocally match date and dollar value.
13 Restricting the sample to public float values from the second fiscal quarter is inevitable because some firms also report their market capitalization within the same 10-K paragraph, typically as of a date close to their fiscal year end. As firms' market capitalization is by definition larger than or equal to the public float, the restriction to observations from the second fiscal quarter thus avoids falsely classifying firms that ought to be in the control group into the treated group. Due to the freedom in wording and ordering on content in 10-K filings, this is the only way to avoid misclassification without manually compiling the 10-K filings in question. We consider float values to belong to a firm's second fiscal quarter if the stated calculation date lies within 30 calendar days of the theoretical fiscal end of the 2nd quarter or, in case no date is reported, if the firm explicitly states that the value refers to its second fiscal quarter end. Float values are considered data errors if they deviate from a firm's COMPUSTAT fiscal year end market capitalization by a factor of 30 or more. This eliminates between 6 and 10 observations per calendar year 14 A balanced panel offers the advantage of tying together pre-reform and post-reform issuance events from the exact same firms, thus allowing us to observe actual changes in behaviour, rather than statistical propensities. We still opt to use a unbalanced panel rather than a balanced panel for two reasons. First, our (core)-sample comprises of 1671 (467) issuance events, all of which we can use if we estimate a regression
Variable Construction
To identify the Reform's causal effect, we rely on difference-in-differences regressions. The treatment group dummy (D) indicates a public float ≥ $700 million at issuance. Issue date from FISD is used to identify the post-reform dummy (A), which takes the value 1 for issues after December 29, 2005.
We analyse the Reform's causal effect on a number of issue characteristics found in FISD. Marketplace is indicated by the dummy variable PUBLIC. 15 COVENANTS is a score indicating the number of different covenants listed in FISD for any given bond issue. Bond yields (COUPON RATE) are set to missing for convertible issues and zero-coupon bonds.
Following Fenn (2000) we further control for credit rating (IG-RATING) by introducing a dummy variable taking the value 1 for issues which receive an investment grade rating by either Moody's or S&P. 16 The offering amount scaled by total assets yields an issue's volume relative to firm size (BOND AMT). Maturity at issue inception (MATURITY) is the difference between an issue's offering date and maturity date. Firm size (LN(ASSETS)) serves as a proxy for firms' access to financial markets due to lower cash flow volatility, lower transaction cost, less informational asymmetries, and better analyst coverage. Liquidity is controlled for with cash and short-term investments (CASH) as firms with precautionary cash holdings are insulated from the risks of delayed access to outside capital (Baskin, 1987; Hugonnier, Malamud, and Morellec, 2010; Kulak, 2011) . Book equity scaled by assets is LEVERAGE. Liquidity (CASH) is firms' cash and short-term investment scaled by book assets. Firm age (AGE) is measured as the number of COMPUSTAT years prior to each observation. We use the share of intangible assets (INTANGIBLES) as a proxy for collateral securing debt holders (1-PPENT/AT). The market-to-book ratio (TOBINS Q) is a proxy for firms investment opportunities. Depreciation and Amortization (D&A/ASSETS) is a proxy for severity of informational asymmetries. using a pseudo panel. For a balanced panel, we can only use those firms which have issued securities before as well as after the Reform, leaving us with 289 (55) events. Second, small and constrained firms are likely issuing capital less frequently, so that dropping firms with observations in only one period would likely induce a bias into our estimates.
15 The variable marketplace further categorizes public issues as public shelf if they were issued under Rule 415, and public non-shelf if they have not been issued under Rule 415.
16 As firms with missing rating information are likely to be small and risky, no rating information should be valued as equivalent to a speculative grade rating. Table 1 To define the treatment indicator D i,j , we consider an issuers' public float in the fiscal quarter preceding the capital issue. 17 We define the indicator to be one if the issuing firm surpassed the SEC's public float threshold at the fiscal quarter end before issuance so that
Summary Statistics
in which issues with public floats clustered around the cut-off are not excluded. The
Reform's two-tiered structure allows us to directly observe its average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) by juxtaposing the evolution of treated and control group firms' issuance.
Assuming parallel trends (see Section 4.4.1 on Placebo Analysis), the evolution of control group firms serves as a counterfactual on how treated firms would have evolved in the absence of treatment.
We estimate the ATET for a number of dependent variables, employing difference-indifferences (DD) and triple-diff (DDD) OLS regressions 18 in which D T reat indicates the issuers' WKSI status, A P ost indicates weather an issue took place after the Reform and P P ublic indicates the issue's marketplace (unless P P ublic is already the dependent variable).
Differences-in-differences regression design hinges on the identifying assumption that treated-and control-group firms respond in the same way to treatment, ie. ATE equals ATET. While this is best achieved through random assignment to treatment and control 17 As a second avenue for firms which do not qualify for WKSI status based on their public float, the SEC offers the option to obtain WKSI status based on offering volume. The SEC's Office of Economic Analysis found that few firms staying below the public float cut-off would meet the offering volume requirement. Further, false treated firms would in principal lead to a downward bias of the treatment effect. As such, the documented ATE should be viewed as a lower bound of the actual ATE 18 As the 2005 Security Offerings Reform assigns WKSI status to a clearly defined set of firms with a public float ≥ $700 million, Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) would in principle also be a feasible choice of empirical procedure. But as we already limit our analysis to observations directly before and after the Reform, additionally confining our analysis to issues of firms which lie in a narrow margin around the $700M public float cut-off would restrict our sample size beyond feasibility. Further, by applying RDD we would only evaluate the local impact of the Reform by focusing on changes in the dependent variable of firms with a public float in a narrow interval around the $700 million cut-off.
groups, in our case assignment is forced by public float, so that treated and control-group firms inevitably differ in size and therefore almost certainly in their issuance characteristics.
We address this issue by introducing a number of control variables which are correlated with the forcing variable 19 and, being linked with informational asymmetries 20 , explain variation in characteristics such as propensity to issue public debt or to use covenants.
Further, industries differ in terms of cash flow volatility or severity of informational asymmetries. Although a good part of industry specific variation should be captured by introducing control variables such as leverage, cash holdings, or intangibles, industry specific intercepts are still likely to be correlated with covariates. As a consequence, we introduce fixed effects on industry level, grouped by two digit SIC codes.
To link the Reform's causal effect on issuance directly to delay, we further need to exclude any alternative channel through which the Reform might influence issuance. While reporting requirements have been relaxed by the Reform, the SEC justifies respective changes by their negligible effect on WKSIs' disclosure environment. Gustafson (2012) and Shroff, Sun, White, and Zhang (2013) find no differences in firms' disclosure charges surrounding the inception of the Reform. The relaxation of blackout periods around securities offerings, although important, is tantamount to a further reduction in delay for treated issuers (Polk, 2012) 21 , so that there is a direct causal channel between treatment effect and delay.
Baseline Regression
We measure the Reform's causal effect on the share of public issuance with an OLS differencein-differences regression with industry fixed effects and clustered standard errors. 22 We estimate
in which Y i,j is an issue's conditional probability to be conducted as a public placement. µ is the average intercept, and α j are industry specific intercepts. The difference-in-differences specification is given by the dummy variables D i,j ,A i,j , and DA i,j . D i,j is an indicator variable which defines whether an issuing firm was affected by the Reform and A i,j is an indicator variable defining whether a security placement took place in the period after the Reform. DA i,j is a dummy for issues by treated firms which took place after the reform. Its coefficient ∆ is the salient coefficient of equation (1) as it represents the Reform's average treatment effect (ATE). It compares pre-and post-reform changes in the share of public placements across firms that were affected by the Reform (treated) and those firms what were not (control). Finally, X i,j is a vector of control variables controlling for differences across treated and control group firms. Models 1 and 2 are without industry fixed effects. Models 3-7 include industry fixed effects, starting with two parsimonious Models 3 and 4, adding bond issue specific information (Model 5), proxies for informational asymmetries (Model 6), and ending with the complete Model 7. The Reform's ATE is given by T reat×P ost. T reat captures the difference between 22 As we estimate an average effect on an entire class of issuers, rather than an individual issuer's reaction, we do not require the marginal properties of a logit-regression near the [0,1] boundaries. Further, the linear interpretation of OLS coefficients is much more intuitive than the marginal interpretation of logit coefficients. We nonetheless discuss the methodology of logit difference-in-differences estimators in appendix A.1. We further discuss and compare logit difference-in-difference estimates in appendix A.2. treated and control group firms before the reform and P ost captures the time of the control group.
All models' estimates of the ATE are all statistically significant at the one percent confidence level and economically large, suggesting that the Reform has led to an increase in public placements among WKSIs in the range of 25-30%.
We note that the coefficients of control variables have the expected sign where they are statistically significant. Agency cost of debt (high leverage & speculative grade-rating), informational asymmetries (low age & high intangibles), and limited internal funds (low CF) are negatively associated with probability to issue public debt. Most importantly, while for the parsimonious Models 1 and 3 the treatment dummy is highly significant (with t-statistics of 6.66 and 3.86 respectively), the treatment dummy becomes insignificant after the inclusion of appropriate controls such as LN(ASSETS), which exhibits a strong correlation with the forcing variable public float, or convertible issues and investmentgrade-rating, both of which are strongly correlated with size.
We can, therefore, reasonably assume that after controlling for firm characteristics, the assignment to treatment and control group is as good as random.
To avoid endogeneity issues, our further analyses will rely on Model 6 which does not include bond specifics which may be chosen jointly with the issuance channel.
The Cross-Sectional Effect of Financing Constraints
Testing the hypothesis that the Reform's treatment effect is chiefly driven by financially constrained firms requires separating firms according to measures of the ex-ante financing frictions they face(also see Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004) . If treated firms reacted to the reform chiefly because it eliminated delay, the response should be much more pronounced for constrained firms which cannot rely on generating internal funds (low payout, low CF/Assets), for which holding precautionary cash is costly (no IG-Rating) and which are prone to informational asymmetries (low Age). Within each year, the bottom (top) half firms in the COMPUSTAT tapes are considered financially unconstrained (constrained) (see Baker, Stein, and Wurgler, 2003; Kulak, 2011; Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004 , for a similar approach). 23 Our sample split works as follows:
• Payout: Within each year from 2003 until 2008, we rank issues by issuers' payout ratios. Firms with zero or negative payout in our sample are considered constrained, while firms with positive payout are considered unconstrained. The payout ratio is calculated as the sum of dividends and repurchases scaled by operating income. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) , among others, show that financially constrained firms are likely to have low payout ratios.
• IG-Rating: We obtain S&P and Moody's rating information on all debt issues. Firms with an investment grade ratings from either agency are considered unconstrained.
Firms with speculative rating or missing rating information are considered constrained.
• Age: Firms 20 years old or younger are considered constrained, firms 21 years or older as unconstrained.
• Table 3 illustrates the cross-classification of the financial constraints criteria we apply. We observe a positive association among sample splits generated by the measures of financing constraints. While there is an and ongoing debate in the literature as to which criteria should be used to capture a firm's financial constraint level, our results show that these different values pick up firms with highly heterogeneous characteristics. We believe that the broad selection of constraint measures ensures a comprehensive test of the impact of financing constraints.
In panel B we re-estimate the fixed-effects difference-in-differences model with controls on firm characteristics but not on issue characteristics (Table 2, Model 6) with various sample splits based on measures of firms' severity of financing constraints. The results show that the Reform's effect on WKSIs' propensity to issue securities on public markets is almost entirely driven by financially constrained firms. For a sample split by Payout Ratio, InvestmentGrade Rating, or Age the ATEs for constrained firms are estimated to be 37%, 48%, and 40% respectively, while the ATE for unconstrained firms is close to zero. A sample split by Cash Flow / Assets shows a difference in constrained firms' ATE (44%), although unconstrained firms, too, exhibit a significant effect (15%). 24
Constant Treatment Effect
We control for the effect of firm characteristics on firms' absolute propensity to issue public or private debt, yet our model specification does not allow for ATE itself to depend on covariates. This assumption is likely too restrictive, as we have already demonstrated that ATE is larger for financially constrained firms. We can relax this restrictive assumption by interacting all covariates with the difference-in-differences main specification. This yields a flexible and fully saturated model which decomposes ATE into a fixed and many covariate dependent parts, allowing us to directly evaluate the impact of various firm characteristics on ATE. We estimate:
in whichx i,j is a rescaled regressor expressing the deviation from the treated group mean in the treatment period, such that: Table 2 , a sample split by the Kaplan-Zingales Index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) yields the opposite result, i.e. 24% (44%) increase in public issuance for constrained (unconstrained) issues. Since in KZ a firm's cash position is computed as an endogenous variable that is affected by financial constraints, KZ-unconstrained firms are payout, investment-rating and cash-flow constrained as documented by Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) all covariatesx . These correspond to the statistics found in all other tables. Column b and c report coefficients for the DD dummies D i,j and A i,j as well as their interactions with the DD specification D i,jx and A i,jx . Most importantly, Column d gives the decomposition of the average treatment effect (ATE). On top the coefficient of the fixed, unit invariant, component DA i,j is given. Below, the coefficients of all the variable unit dependent components of ATE, DA i,jx , are given.
As expected, the size of ATE depends significantly on firm characteristics. First off all, the fixed component of ATE predicts the Reform's effect on a firm withx i,j equal zero, thus representative of the average treated firm in the post period. Consistent with our finding that the Reform had a stronger effect on financially constrained firms, we find that ATE decreases in age, size and cash. Cash Flow has a surprisingly weak, although positive, effect, casting doubt on the causal effect of cashflows, as cash flow constrained firms are at the same time likely to be younger and smaller than their unconstrained peers. Finally, ATE exhibits a strong positive correlation with Leverage and Intangibles.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
Overall, we find that the Reform's ATE is mostly, if not completely, driven by financially constrained firms. This finding is fully consistent with a causal channel from delay in raising outside capital to firms' opting for private placement.
Placebo Analysis
The difference-in-differences analyses we conducted thus far rely on a number of identifying assumptions. First and foremost, we assume parallel trends, that is in the absence of treatment and after controlling for covariates, the difference between control and treated observations should remain constant. The Parallel Trends assumption requires that conditional on the control variables Θ i,j , the error term i,j be uncorrelated with D i,j ; the dummy variable indicating treatment. This implies that in a counter factual world without reform, and after controlling for the covariates Θ, the relative frequency of private placements should evolve in the same way for treated and control firms. That means that as far as their change in private placement frequency is concerned, firms should be as good as randomly assigned to treatment and control group.
While we cannot directly test for parallel trends, we can provide evidence to corroborate it. First, the coefficient for treatment D i,j becomes insignificant after including appropriate controls (see section 4.2). Second, if the parallel trends assumption held and no treatment occurs, we expect ATE to be insignificant. This we can test with a so-called Placebo Analysis, by repeating our standard fixed effects difference-in-differences model (Table 2, Model 6) for overlapping two year periods, surrounding but not entailing the Reform.
Our sample stretches the period beginning in 2003 after the turmoil ensuing the burst of the dotcom bubble and ends just before the burgeoning credit crunch in 2008, so that market driven disruptions seem unlikely. Further, while the Homeland Investment Act of 2004 granted US firms a temporary tax break on repatriated earnings, target capital structure considerations would imply that firms use repatriated funds to temporarily increase payout, rather than to substitute debt issues (Blouin and Krull, 2009; Faulkender and Petersen, 2011) . The results of the placebo analyses are reported in Table 5 below.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
The results diffuse concerns that changes in the frequency of private placements would fluctuate systematically across treated and control firms in the same way they do around the Overall, the evidence from the placebo analysis unequivocally supports the difference-indifferences identifying assumption that treatment and control samples evolve in parallel in the absence of external interventions.
Debt vs. Equity
We suppose that the elimination of regulatory delay primarily benefits public debt, so that firms respond to the Reform by partly switching from equity to debt and therefore increasing importance of parallel trends, we include in our sample only firms with a public float in the range from $400 million to $ 1 billion. Industry fixed effects account for industry specific differences in leverage. The simple difference-in-differences model then becomes:
in which D i,j indicates treatment status and α j and γD i,j are overall and industry specific intercepts.
The regression results are reported in Panel A of Table 6 . 
As yields vary across years, driven by macro economic conditions, we further introduce half-year fixed effects in Models (3) & (4).
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] As hypothesized, and in line with empirical evidence from the inception of rule 144A, we find that a reduction in delay has no impact on yields. Further, the introduction of industry fixed effects does not lead to any changes in R 2 , suggesting that firm characteristics are commensurately reflecting any industry specific variation.
Covenants
We further examine whether investors require a more comprehensive set of covenants in response to accelerated debt offerings. Our complete sample contains 42 different types of covenants. We first eliminate covenants which occur for less than 1% of all issues. Next, we merge covenant pairs which stipulate the exact same restriction for the issuer and the issuer's subsidiaries, since such covenant pairs exhibit close to perfect correlation in our sample. 26
Finally, we aggregate covenants which are similar, such as "Economic covenant defeasance" & "Legal defeasance", or "Covenant defeasance w/o tax consequence" & "Defeasance w/o tax consequence". We identify a total of 18 diverse as well as frequently occurring covenants, out of which we construct a covenant score which counts the number of covenants in place(for a similar approach see Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003) . 27
As the availability of covenant information in our sample is strongly biased towards large firms with a public float larger than $700 million, we eliminate non-WKSIs from the complete sample to obtain a WKSI-only sub-sample with 509 observations from 2003-2008. Like that, all public issues are automatically treated, and all private issues serve as a control group. Since we compare the trends of covenant usage in large public issues (treated) to large private issues (control), private issues serve as a counterfactual. This setting is contingent on two restrictive but not unreasonable assumptions. First, non-WKSIs usage of covenants should not change significantly from 2005 to 2006. This is plausible, as for instance the time dummy A is insignificant and with changing signs in Table 8 , hinting at no change over time for treated issues. Second, while issuers self-select into public or private issuance, their choice of issuance channel should not be educated by considerations of avoiding covenants.
The opposite seems more plausible, as financially constrained firms, for which the increase in covenant usage is most pronounced, are most likely to switch from private to public issues in response to the reform. We estimate the Reform's effect on covenant usage with the following difference-in-differences specification:
in which the causal effect of accelerated issuance is given by P bA i,j . Table 8 illustrates the Reform effect on covenant usage. Model 1 depicts the complete WKSI sample, whereas Models 2-9 are sample splits applying the criteria for financial constraint introduced in section 4.3. Overall, our results suggest that the Reform leads to an increase in covenant usage significant at a 1% level, implying an increase in the covenant score by 2.4. Further, the increase in covenant usage is driven by financially unconstrained firms which on average increase their covenant score by 3. The finding that increased covenant usage is driven by un-constrained firms, sheds light on the way covenants are negotiated, but further research is required.
[
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE]
We repeat the above regression separately for each of the 18 covenant types of which the covenant score is comprised. The increase in covenant usage is especially pronounced for covenants addressing debt overhang-and payout concerns. Further, clauses on "Fixed
Charge Coverage", "Cross-Acceleration", "Negative Pledge Covenants", and "Defeasance without Tax Consequences" are used more frequently following the Reform.
[INSERT 
A Logit difference-in-difference
This appendix demonstrates that the results obtained by logit regression are consistent with those obtained through OLS. We adapt the non-linear difference-in-differences approach of Puhani (2012) and use the notation of Angrist and Pischke (2008) .
A.1 Methodology
Consider a standard difference-in-difference model in which Y 1 and Y 0 are two potential binary outcomes with and without treatment respectively. D is the treatment dummy and A is the post period dummy. DA is an interaction dummy for treated observations in the post period. X is a vector of covariates with the coefficients Θ. In a linear model, the treatment effect on the treated δ = δ(D = 1, A = 1) is:
Now consider a non-linear difference-in-difference model, where Φ(•) be the conditional distribution function of a standard normal distribution. Puhani (2012) shows that this result applies to all non-linear models of parametric structure as Φ(•) could be any non-linear but strictly monotone transformation function. As such, the standard logit difference-indifference model is:
and the treatment effect τ in a logit difference-in-difference model is equal to the crossdifferences so that:
Therefore the treatment effect τ is zero iff the coefficient δ of the interaction term DA is zero. As Φ is strictly monotone, the sign of δ is equal to the sign of the treatment effect τ . Ai and Norton (2003) discuss that the treatment effect is the marginal change of the coefficient of the interaction term δ, allowing locally for a linear interpretation of δ when keeping σ, λ, and Θ constant. We use the Stata command "margin dydx" to find the local impact of a covariate on the dependent variable by determining the dependent variables first derivative w.r.t. the covariate. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the regression outputs, all tables display such local linear estimates of the coefficients. As the impact is contingent on the values the remaining covariates take, we set all remaining covariates equal to the sample mean of the sub-sample the regression uses.
We estimate the standard logit difference-in-difference model
where Y i is an issue's conditional probability to be conducted as a private placement, D i
is an indicator variable that defines whether an issuing firm was affected by the Reform (discussed below in more detail) and A i is an indicator variable defining whether a security placement took place in the period after the Reform. DA i is an indicator variable that defines placements which are conducted by treated firms after the Reform. Finally, X i is a vector of control variables. δ is the salient coefficient of equation (x) as it represents the Reform's average treatment effect on the treated (ATET).
A.2 Logit Results
The results depicted in Table 10 show, that estimates of the average treatment effect which are obtained using a logit difference-in-difference model are in the same range albeit even more significant than the OLS estimates (compare Table 3 ). Further, none of the significant controls change signs. As mentioned before, the logit model only yields local linear estimates, so that a meaningful marginal interpretation of the intercept is not possible.
B Comparison Across Security Classes
While not the focus of this paper, as a byproduct of our analysis we obtained a sample in which SEOs are matched with public float information. This allows us to juxtapose characteristics of firms issuing equity, convertible debt and straight debt. All proxies of size, such as public float, book assets and market capitalization data, are lowest for common stock issues, a bit higher for convertible debt issues and by far the highest for straight debt issues.
Within each security class, private issuers tend to be smaller than public issuers, but more strikingly, issuers of public stock are still smaller on average than issuers of private convertible debt, and issuers of public convertible debt are on average smaller than issuers of private straight debt. This corroborates our assumption that firms chose a suitable security class primarily based on their characteristics, and only then decide on private or public issues. Table 11 illustrates the reform's causal effect on firm's propensity to issue on public markets. As expected, the Reform's effect remains positive when separately evaluating convertible debt and straight debt. However, we find that less delay in public SEOs did not increase the share of public SEOs. This makes intuitive sense as equity exhibits large informational asymmetries, so that investors should value time to conduct research. This finding is in line with Gustafson (2012), who finds 27% more underpricing in accelerated SEOs. As debt and equity issues differ in aspects as salient as the way their values respond to changes in volatility or uncertainty, it is not surprising that the effects of leverage or age are exactly opposed between debt and common equity issues. Further, the coefficients for Intangibles, or Depreciation and Amortisation differ significantly between Convertible and Straight debt.
[INSERT Both panels depict the differences between the Treated (public float >$700M) and Control (public float <$700M) sub-samples. * * * , * * , * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Only issues which satisfy all sample criteria and have non-missing values for FLOAT are retained. PUBLIC indicates public market issues. FLOAT is public float. ASSETS are total book assets. LEVERAGE is debt scaled by total assets. CASH (cash and short term investments), D&A (depreciation and amortization cost), INTANGIBLES (Assets -Current Assets -PP&E), and BOND AMT (face value of issue) are scaled by assets. AGE is proxied by firms' earliest CRSP records. TOBINS Q gives book to market value of assets. CONVERTIBLE and IG-RATING (issue is investment gradee) are dummies while COVENANTS is a score counting the number of covenants attached to an issue. YIELD gives an issue's coupon rate. Observations from the core sample are used. The ATE (T reat × P ost) is estimated for the complete sample as well for various constrained and unconstrained sub-samples. T -statistics (in parentheses) are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by industry. * * * , * * , * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
